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Increased Crime and Legalizing 
Gambling Operations: The Impact 
on the Socia-Economics of 
Business and Government 
By John Warren Kindt * 
Legalized gambling activities in various Jonns are being rapidly 
adopted by TIUlny states, but no state has a comprehensive develop-
mental plan that includes the overall socio-economic costs oJlegaliz-
ing gambling. In this situation, states considering initiating or 
expanding legalized gambling activities must necessarily extrapolate 
from the best reports available that analyze those specialized costs 
associated with legalized gambling activities from a statewide per-
spective. Unlike most business activities, legalized gambling activi-
ties add three significant costs to government: (1) regulatory costs; 
(2) socio-economic costs occasioned by new compulsive gambling 
activities; and (3) costs to the criminal justice system. These three 
costs, and in particular. the increased costs to the criminal justice 
system, are reviewed from the strategic perspective of state govern-
ments. This article concludes that the flow oj new tax revenues 
generated by increasing legalized gambling activities can theoreti-
cally stay ahead oJincreased costs to a given state's criminal justice 
system. but the increased costs overwhelm'the benefits when all oj 
the costs are considered. 
"[G]ambling itself . . . is probably the biggest producer of money 
for the American La Cosa Nostra [that] there is. J't 
Critics of expanded legalized gambling activities argue that 
if the U.S. public has been satisfied with the progress in the 
"War on Drugs," that public is going to be ecstatic about the 
• Professor, University of Dlinois, Urbana-Champaign, ill. Professor Kindt 
teaches courses on commerce and legal policy. 
1 '18mes Moody, Chief of the Organized Crime Section, FBI, as quoted in 
Videotape/T~cript of '~60 Minutes," Dec. 13, 1992 (CBS). For extensive lists 
of similar statements by authoritative officials in the U.S. criminal justice system, 
see-Chicago Crime Comm'n, Analysis of Key 'Issues Involved in the Proposed 
Chicago Casino Gambling Project 9, 11-12 (1992) [hereinafter cited as Chicago 
Crime Comm'n]; Testimony of Robert R. Fuesel, Exec. Dir;, Chicago Crime 
Comm'n, Before the ill., Sen. Subcomm. on Gaming, June 8, 1993, at 1-4. See 
generally President's Commission on ,Organized Crime,The Edge: Organized 
Crime, Business, and lAbor Unions (Mar. 1986); W. Roemer, Man Against the 
Mob (1989). 
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forthcoming ."War on Gambling."2 There are some obvious 
parallels.3 Arguably, the war on drugs was not even necessary 
until ~e· widespread use of illegal drugs during the 1960s when 
such use came under the rubric of social acceptability. 4 A 
recognized addictive activity similar to illegal drug use, gambling 
was not just becoming sociologically acceptable, but as of the 
19808 ~ it w~s being" legalized' "-:-unlike harmful dnigs. Sociolo-
2 See generally TIL St. Police, Div. Crim.lnvestigation, Intelligence Bur., How 
ClJ3ino Gambling Affects lAw Enforcement (Apr. 16, 1992) [hereinafter cited as TIl. 
St. Police Report]. The laundering of money by legalized gambling operations 
appears to be a common problem. During 1992, for example, "Atlantic City's 
casinos . . . [were] under investigation for laundering drug money." Roeser, 
"Chicago Casino Plan Gambles City Future," Wall St. J., Aug. 12, 1992, § A, at 
10 [hereinafter cited as Roeser]. Less than two years after being initiated, the TIlinois 
State Police Director, Terrance Gainor, reported that investigations were "being 
conducted. into suspected laundering of illegal drug profits through the riverboats" 
in TIlinois. Urbanek, "Probe Creating Fears for Riverboats' Image," Daily Herald 
(Arlington Heights, TIl.), Nov. 21, 1992, § I, at 4; "Laundering on Riverboats," 
News-Sun (Waukegan, TIl.), Nov. 20, 1992, at 1. 
For analyses by the Chicago Crime Commission opposing the introduction ofland-
based casino gambling to Chicago, see Report of the Chicago Crime Commission on 
Organized Crime in Chicago (J. Conlon, Pres. 1990). For analyses by the N.Y. 
Attorney General's office opposing the introduction of land-based casino gambling 
to New York State, see R. Abrams, Report of Attorney General Robert Abrams in 
Opposition to Legalized Casino Gambling· in New York State (May 1981). For 
arWYses of the impacts ofland-based casino gambling on Atlantic City, New Jersey, 
see O'Brien & Flaherty, "Re~ation of the Atlantic City Casino Industry and 
Attempts to Control Its· Infiltration by Organized Crime," 16 Rutgers L.J. 721 
(1985). 
3 For examples of the parallel costs of pathological gambling activities and other 
medical treatment costs (such as for alcoholics), see Politzer, Morrow, & Leavey, 
Report on the Societal Cost o(Pathological Gambling and the Cost-Benefit/Effective-
ness· of Treatment (5th Nat'l Coni. on Gambling and Risk Taking 1981) [hereinafter 
cited as Politzer, Morrow, & Leavey]. "Studies demonstrate that there is a high 
degree of overlap among. pathological gambling, alcoholism and drug addiction." 
Lesieur, "Female Pathological Gamblers and Crime," in Gambling Behavior and 
Problem Gambling 495, 497 (1993) [hereinafter cited as Gamblers and Crime]. 
• To transpose this "acceptability factor" to legal gambling as increasing illegal 
gambling activities,see U.S. Commission on the Rev. of the Nat'l Pol'y Toward 
Gambling, Gambling in America 49 (Gov't Printing Off. 1976) [hereinafter cited as 
U.S. Commission on Gambling]. For a review of the literature interfacing pathologi-
cal gambling and drug addiction, s~ Gamblers and Crime, note 3 supra, at 497. 
, For example, the Chicago Crime Commission opposed the 1992 proposal to 
build a $2-billion casino complex in Chicago. . .. . ..:. .•. . ; ..... . 
Those ·who have been involved in the successful investigation and prosecution of 
organized: crime . believe that the legalization of casino gambling would fuel a 
renaissance·oforganized crime. It is incorrect to see casino gambling as a way to 
beat-or~anized crime at its game. Instead, legalized gambling creates the atmo-
sphere ID.which organized crime [thrives] .... Also, the widespread acceptance 
of casino gambling will encourage people to try the other forms of gambling 
controlled by organized crime, because those forms of gambling do not provide 
reCords for the Internal Revenue Service and other authorities. 
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gists recognize that this "acceptability factor" combined with 
an "accessibility factor' , will increase the number of compulsive 
gamblers in society. 6 The "legalization" of gambling activities 
means that society can anticipate that the number of compulsive 
gamblers will increase from. 77 percent of the overall population 7 
to between 1 . .5 and 5 percent of the populations-with a total of 
10 percent of the population constituting problem economic 
gamblers. 9 Historical trends and conditioning factors indicate 
. that the war on gambling will be the added sociological war of 
the 1990s-financed Oy society in general and by the taxpayers 
in particular. 10 
In 1976, the definitive U.S. Commission on the Review of 
the National Policy Toward Gamblingll cautioned against the 
trends toward legalizing and expanding legaJized gambling activi-
ties and anticipated the increased socia-economic costs and costs 
to the criminal justice system of ignoring these warnings. 12 
Among other findings, the Commission concluded "[i]t is axio-
matic that the two principal goals oflegalized gambling-revenue 
raising and crime control-are incompatible. "13 Another conclu-
sion was that gambling activities "contribute[d] more than any 
Press release of the Chicago Crime Commission, May 28, 1992. 
6 See, e.g., Politzer, Morrow, & Leavey, note 3 supra, at 2. See generally A. 
Lilienfeld & D. Lilienfeld, Foundations of Epidemiology (2d ed. 1980). For a 
summary (in the political context) of the academic consensus supporting these twin 
concepts of the "acceptability factor" and the "accessibility factor," see Better 
Gov't Assoc., Staff White Paper: Casino Gambling in Chicago 2 et seq. (1992) 
(copies available from Better Gov't Assoc., Chicago, TIL) [hereinafter cited as Better 
Gpv't Assoc. Report]; Wynn Resources, Alta. Lotteries & Gaming, Gambling and 
Problem Gambling in Alberta 17 (1994) [hereinafter cited as Alta. Gaming]. 
·7 The most authoritative baseline data available was reported in 1976 by the 
U.S. Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling. U.S. 
Commission on Gambling, note 3 supra, at 73; see, e.g., Gamblers and Crime, 
note 3 supra, at 495 (.77 percent ofU .S. adult population were probable compulsive 
gamblers. 
I For a summary of the increases in compUlsive gambling in different U.S. and 
worldwide jurisdictions, see, e.g., Alta. Gaming, note 6 supra, at 17-18. See also 
Meyer & Fabian, "Pathological Gambling and Criminal Behavior," in Gambling 
Behavior and Problem Gambling 517,517-518 (1993) (statistics for Fed. Republic 
of Germany) [hereinafter cited as Meyer & Fabian]. r 
9 See, e.g., Alta. Gaming, note 6 supra, at 18 (table). 
10 See note 2 supra and accompanying text. . 
.. II U.S. Commission on Gambling, note 4 supra. 
I~ See, e.g.,id. at ix, 40-42, 49, 72-74. 
IJ U.S. Commission on Gambling, note 4 supra, at 1. 
540 
LEGALIZING GAMBLING OPERATIONS 
other single enterprise to police corruption in ... [U.S.] cities 
and towns and to. the well-being of the Nation's criminals. "14 
Furthermore, the Commission reported that there was "some 
evidence that the existence of gambling sanctioned, licensed, or 
run by the various states-and the attendant publicity-tends to 
increase citizen participation in illegal as well as legal gam-
bling. "I' In 1988, this observation received more conclusive 
support from the New Jersey Governor's Advisory Commission 
on Gambling. 16 However, in the years since these Commissions, 
these caveats have slowly eroded from the public memory, and 
the aforementioned trends have apparently intensified. 
Proponents of increased legalized gambling activities counter 
that these social negatives are more than offset by the increased 
tax revenues and new jobs created by legalizing gambling activi-
ties. Increased tax revenues and jobs are definitely created by 
the initial increases in legalized gambling activities. 17 However, 
critics argue that the increased social-welfare costs dwarf the 
benefits and that preexisting businesses are "economically canni-
balized" by legalized gambling enterprises. 18 To investigate these 
claims, the Ford Foundation and the Aspen Institute funded a 
study by the Center for Economic Development at the University 
of Massachusetts. 19 This study analyzed fourteen major reports 
prepared to evaluate increased legalized gambling activities.2O 
Only one report was considered balanced21 and the reports advo-
1-' [d. atix. 
" [d. at 49 (emphasis added). 
16 The New Jersey Commission "heard from law enforcement officials in New 
Jersey who contend[ed] that legalized gaming has not only failed to curb illegal 
gambling but in fact has been conducive to its growth," arid the Commission 
concluded that legalized gambling did not decrease the illegal gambling in New 
Jersey. N.J. Governor's Adv. COmln'n on Gambling, Report and Recommendations 
19 (1988) [hereinafter cited as N.J. Adv. Comm'n]. 
11 For.specific examples of the "initial" positive impacts of new jobs and tax 
revenues concentrated in a localized area, see M. Madden, Economic and Fiscal 
Impacts Associated With the First Year of Gaming: Deadwood, South Dakota (1991). 
This report cautioned that only a short time frame was analyzed. [d.· at 2-4. See 
generally B.Davis~GamblinginAmerica: A Growth Industry 12-16 (1992). 
II See, e.g., R." Goodman, Legalized Gambling as a Strategy for Economic 
Development 39-40,51-56 (1994) (Ctr.Econ. Dev., U. Mass.) [hereinafter cited 
as Goodman]. " .~ 
. . . . 
19 Goodman, note 18 supra. 
2\! [d. at 16. 
11 [d. at 70. 
541 
CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 
cating increased .legalized gambling activities were tagged as 
"often done by the industry itself"21 and as "hiding the costs,"23 
including increased costs to the criminal justice system. 24 
This debate is far-reaching and beyond the scope of this 
discussion, but the gravan;ten of the present analysis is that as the 
University of Massachusetts report concluded "[t]here are no 
state gambling plans"2' and "[t]he research used by public 
officials to evaluate projects is often done by the gambling 
industry itself.' '26 Accordingly, public policy and legal policy 
dictate that a state considering utilizing legalized gambling activi-
ties as economic development should rely primarily on nonindus-
try studies that are statewide or regional analyses and that have a 
strategic perspective. In this context, increased cos~s to the 
criminal justice system that are occasioned by increased legalized 
gambling activities must necessarily rely on the most authoritative 
and current reports available and extrapolate within a statewide 
or regional popUlation base. Such an analysis can frame the 
parameters for future debate and encourage more detailed studies. 
The present analysis focuses on only the potential for increased 
costs to a statewide criminal justice system as viewed in strategic 
policymaking .. While other socio-economic cost-benefit issues 
should also ·be reviewed in state economic plans, these other 
issues are too broad for this analysis and are, therefore, not 
addressed. From the perspective of business activity,new busi-
nesses will tend not to locate or expand into those areas where 
crime is increasing .at a rate greater than the national average. 27 
DId. at 16 . 
... 
. .D-Id. 
-l~ Id. 
l'Id .. 
l~ Id. 
L 
27 In business location models, the "community environment" appears to be the 
most important factor (or one of the most important factors) in the different decision-
making analyses. "Increasing crime" would almost uniformly raise a "red flag" in 
these analyses. For historical background and an introduction to business decision 
making in general, see .F. Rosenkranz, An Introduction to Corporate Modeling 
(Duke Univ. Press 1979); See gener~I)J J. Browning, How to Select a Business Site 
(1980); W l Kinnard & S. Messner, Effective Business Relo~ation (1970); D. Smith, 
In4u.s~a~ Location (1981); J. Thompson, Site Selection (1982); A. Weber, Theory 
o/the Location o/Industries (C. Friedrich trans., Univ. Chicago Press 1937). 
Businesses should note the trends evidenced in the FBI crime statistics from 1975 
to 1992: U.S. Dep't Just., Fed. Bur. Investigation, Crime in the United States: 
Uniform Crime Reports (1975-1992) [hereinafter cited as FBI Reports (with· relevant 
date)] .. See also Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dep't, Annual Statistical Report: 
Fiscal Year 1990-1991. 
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As a corollary, states with legalized gambling in general and 
locales with particular outlets for legalized gambling will be at 
high risk not only for failing to attract new businesses, but also 
for losing preexisting businesses. 28 Preexisting businesses in 
areas where crime is increasing will be tempted to downsize, 
expand elsewhere, or even move entirely to another location. 
States and locales encouraging the gambling philosophy could 
easily have" crime rates that increase exponentially above the 
national average.29 It is significant that strategic "business-
oriented" reports have noted, for example, "the rate of increase 
in crime in Atlantic City [which] accelerated 150% (from a 5.4% 
to a 13.6% increase per year) after gambling was legalized."30 
Given the nationwide preoccupation of states to legalize more 
and "harder" forms of gambling, it can be argued that those 
states without legalized gambling will be at a significant strategic 
business-economic advantage over those states that legalize gam-
bling. 
In 1994, these socio-economic concerns were recognized and 
echoed by authoritative law enforcement officials; for example, 
Michigan Attorney General Frank Kelley has said: 
Many people try to argue that casinos bring positive results. They 
say that casinos mean more jobs-more money for the state-a different 
image. I would say to each of those statements that any positive impact 
would be so totally outweighed by the negatives that they should want 
no part ofit. 31 
Instinctively, at least some law enforcement officials appear to 
be concerned with the projected increases in costs to the criminal 
justice system, as well as the impacts on the preexisting social 
~8 The exception to this corollary consists of those businesses providing cluster 
services for legalized gambling activities, because of course, these businesses will 
tend to locate in areas with legalized gambling activities. 
]9 See note 27 supra. See also III. St. Police Report, note 2 supra, at 3-11. See 
generally, Better Gov:t Assoc. Report, note 6 supra, at 76-126 (a thorough summary 
of crime-related issues)~ 
30 Cal. Governor's Off. Plan.. & Research, California and Nevada.' Subsidy, 
Monopoly, and Competitive Effects of Legalized Gambling ES-3 (Dec. 1992). 
Increased numbers of people entering the area contributed to this phenomenon, but 
from the perspective of pre-existing residents,businesses, and taxpayers, the 
gravamen is that social problems relating to crime will increase. Id. '"" ", , . 
II Speech by Frank Kelley, Mich. Att'y Gen. "before the Int'I Conference on 
Gambling, Nashville, Tenn., Feb. 11, 1994, at 3 [hereinafter cited 'as Mich. Att'y 
Gen.J.For lists of similar statements by other authorities, see note 1 supra. 
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fabric that are occasioned by legalized gambling activities-
particularly casinos. 32 The analysis by Attorney General Kelley's 
staff and the conclusions are typical: 33 
According to [the] FBI figures, between 1977, when the first casino 
opened in Atlantic City, and 1986, just nine years later, the incidence of 
larceny per capita increased by four hundred and sixty-seven percent.34 
Incidence of all crime combined increased by [one] hundred and thirty-
eight percent-and this figure includes all categories of violent crime. 
including rape and x:obbery. 3' 
When Detroit was considering a vote on casino gambling back in 
. 1988, I shared those statistics with a study commission and pointed out 
that a one hundred percent increase in crime in Detroit would paint a 
picture of absolute chaos that could barely be imagined. And, that any 
money brought into the city would quickly be spent on an expanded law 
enforcement effort to control the crime. 36 (Emphasis added.) 
As an expert with decades of experience, his conclusion was 
unequivocal. "I have been Michigan's Attorney General for 
more than thirty years, and there has never been an issue that 
has disturbed me any more than the proliferation of gambling in 
our state."37 From the business perspective; 'any issue that con-
cerns a state's chief legal officer to such an extent should 
necessarily concern businesses and business executives. 
Delimitation of Costs 
As in some other issue areas, it is sometimes difficult to 
calculate the increased "administrative costs" associated with 
legalized gambling activities. The data is preliminary in several 
regards, but some observations and conclusions can be made. 
With regard to the administrative, costs of monitoring and regulat-
Jl .Id. 
l'ld .. 
J4 Compare FBI Reports .1977, note 27 supra, 'at 98 (Table 6), with FBI Reports 
1986, note 27, supra at 88 (Table 6). In 1992, the larceny.rates were down from 
1986, but those rates still indicated approximately a 400 percent increase since 1977. 
FBI Reports 1992, note 27 supra, at 134 (Table 6). 
~ Compare FBI Reports. 1977 ,note 27 supra; at 98 (Table 6), with FBI Reports 
1986, note 27 supra, at 88 (Table 6). "Atlantic City'S crime statistics again greatly 
overShadows [sic] all of the national level increases that were experienced in 1977 
and 1990." TIL St. Police Report, note 2 supra, at S. Compare FBI Repqrts 1977, 
note 27 supra, at 98 (Table 6), with FBI Reports 1990, note 27 supra, at 50, 51 
(Tables 1,2). . . 
36 Mich. Att'y Gen., note 31 supra, at 3-4. 
37 Id. at 2. 
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ing casino gambling, states can profit by extrapolating from the 
costs experienced by similar gambling locales. In the absence of 
any comprehensive state plans relating to legalized gambling 
activities,38 state policymakers are basically relegated to utilizing 
this type of approach-particularly when short decision-making 
time frames are involved. 
Given these constraints, it should be noted that the administra-
tive costs of regulating just the "casino gambling" in Atlantic 
City, New Jersey, for example, are approximately $56 million 
to $59 million per year. 39 These costs can be delimited in a variety 
of ways, e.g., as a function of "visits," or of local patrons vis-
a-vis gambling tourists. From a state governmental perspective, 
however, these costs can be expressed as a function of the state 
budget': Since the 1991 fiscal year budget of New Jersey was 
24.7 billion,'"' the calculation is as follows: 
$56 million + $24.7 billion = .23 % 
Of course, this number appears small, but it looms larger when 
it is combined with the projected socio-economic costs to New 
Jersey and then compared to the state revenues actually generated 
by legalized gambling activities.41 
1I Goodman, note 18 supra, at 16. 
39 St. N.J., Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 238 (1992) ($56-$57 million 
for casino regulatory costs); N.J. Casino Control Comm'n, 1992 Annual Report 23 
(1992) ($57 million for casino regulatory costs in 1992, $62 million in 1991). To 
keep the time frames uniform and to accommodate "fiscal year" variations, the 
'focus is on 1992 and 1991. Other time periods are given for purposes of comparison. 
N.J. Adv. Comm'n, supra note 16 supra, at 65 ($66.4 million regulatory costs and 
1,362 regulatory employees in 1986 for "all" gambling activities, and $76.6 million 
regulatory costs in 1987); see N.J. St. Budget, FY 1986-1987; N.J. St. Budget, FY 
1991-1992. See also, Roes~r, note 2 supra, at 10 ($59 million for casino regulatory 
costs in 1992). In 1989, the regulatory costs for Atlantic City were also estimated at 
$85 mill!on per year.,-Statement of William Thompson, Prof. Mg't & Pub. Admin., 
UNLV, before the Dl. Sen. Comm. regarding S.B. 572 on Riverboat Gambling, 
Sept. 27, 1989. See generally Lee & Chelius, "Government Regulation of Labor-
Management Corruption: The Casino Industry Experience in New Jersey," 42 
Indus. & Lab. ReI. Rev: 536 (1989); Dl. St. Police Report, note 2 supra. 
«J U.S. Bur. Census, U.S. Dep't Com., Statistical Abstract of the United States 
1993,300 (113th ed. 1993) (figures are for 1991) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Abstract 
1993]; see The World Almanac 137 (1993). For uniformity and ease of reference 
for the general public, the, World Almanac can provide basic numbers. Of course, 
actual state budgets provige more ~ccurate calculations. See also N.J. Adv. Comm' n, 
note 16 supra. . 
4' Except in Nevada and New Jersey, legalized gambling activities do not 
contribute over 2 percent of the revenues of any state budget. For a statement of this 
basic proposition, see World Book Encyclopedia, 1994 World Book Year Book 398 
[hereinafter cited as 1994 Year Book]. Gambling taxes provide Nevada with 
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In a similar context, the Illinois State Police calculated 'that 
their law enforcement costs would increase by 50 percent, or 
$100 million per year, 42 if a 1992 proposal for a $2-billion casino 
complex was approved for Chicago. Governor James Edgar 
estimated that this amount would just match the state's realistic 
share of the projected new tax revenues from the casinos; that is, 
$100 million.43 As a function of the state budget for fiscal year 
approximately 20 percent of its revenues. St. Nev., Comprehensive Annual Financial 
Report 8 (1992) (19.75 percent in·1992, 23 percent in 1991); see Nev. St. Gaming· 
Control Bd., Nevada Gaming Abstract 1992, I-I, 1-2. Contra 1994 Year Book, 
infra, at 398 (40 percent). By comparison, New Jersey received between 3 and 7.2 
percent from 1978 to 1989 with the more recent projections in the range of 6 percent. 
N.J. Adv. Comm'n, note 16 supra, at 48 . 
• ~ Speech by Terrance W. Gainor, Dir. Ill. St. Police, at the Ann. IAODAPCA 
Luncheon, May 8, 1992, at 10 (for "p-olice services alone") [hereinafter cited as 
Dir. III. St. Police]; Chicago Crime Comm'n, note .1 supra, at 21. The range of 
projected increases to the budget of the Illinois state police was between $42 million 
and $100· million, but since the Director frequently utilized the more cautious 
estimate of $100 million, this is the estimate utilized. Although delimited in 
budgetary terms, these estimates apparently parallel the $41 million to $100 million 
increa&ed costs calculated by interfacing "the incidence of index crime and the 
subsequent cost to the criminal system to handle those crimes." TIL Crim. Just. 
Info. Authority, Casino Gambing and Crime in Chicago 46 (1992) [hereinafter cited 
as Crim. Just. Info.]. These cost estimates did not include increased costs for 
(1) regulation; (2) victimization impact; (3) prosecution of organized crime; (4) 
additional facilities for system workload; or (5) "response to non-index crimes, 
such as DUI, fraud, extortion, embezzlement, prostitution, and drug offenses." 
Crim. Just. Info., infra, at 46 & 47. See also Ill. Crim. Just. Info. Authority, 
Riverboat Gambling and Crime in Illinois 2, 3 (1994) (referencing the $41 million 
to $100 million. in costs as specifically related to "Chicago"). The lack of uniform 
categories of costs in many reports makes comparisons difficult. 
Government policy makers frequently argue that the burden of proof should be 
on the legalized gambling interests to refute any cautious projections by state 
agencies-particularly law enforcement agencies. 'On the other hand, proponents of 
increased legalized gambling activities often argu~ that law enforcement bureaucra-
cies tend to inflate the costs to the criminal justice system to increase their budgets. 
Another common argument justifying increased legalized gambling activities is 
that persons gambling illegally will transfer their money into legalized gambling 
activities, but there is no documentation that this phenomenon occurs and there is 
more support for the proposition that increased "acceptability" via legalization 
increases the illegal gambling activities already in process. For a review of the 
literature discounting the proposition that increased legalized gambling activities 
wi1l decrease illegal gambling activities, see 111. St. Police Report, note 2 supra, at 
10-11 (confirming the conclusion of the U.S. Commission on Gambling). See 
generally Fowler, Mangione, & Pratter, Nat'llnst. L. Enforcement & Crim. Just., 
L. Enforcement Assistance admin. , U.S. Dep'tJustice, Gambling Law Enforcement 
in Major Cities (l978).·See, e.g., N.J. Adv. Comm'n, note 16 supra, at 19. "The 
Commission has .heard evidence that the impact of legalized gaming has reduced 
neither the magnitude nor the frequency of illegal gllII1bling in New Jersey." N.J. 
Adv. Comm'n, note 16 supra, at 19. 
o Interview with III. Gov. James Edgar, on "Crossfire," Cable News Network, 
Jan. 6, 1993. 
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1991, these increased state police costs would be: 
$100 million + $25.1 billion44 = .398 % 
While the added tax revenues were also $100 million or .398 
percent of the state budget, which appeared to be a breakeven 
proposition, there were other costs associated with legalized 
gambling activities that were not associated with traditional 
business activities. As calculated in a study sponsored by the 
proponents of the casino complex,45 the "regulatory" costs were 
calculated at $65 million per yeaf"6 and increased Chjcago police 
and fire protection costs were $11.4 million per year. 47 
By compariso!l, the projected costs to the criminal justice 
system for a New' Orleans casino, one-seventh to one-tenth the 
siZe of the proposed Chicago casinos, were $14 million per year, 
including increased police and corrections systems costs of $1 0.4 
million, increased costs of $2.3 million for the district attorney's 
office, and increased 'costs to courts of$1.5 million.48 The obvious 
temptation to illinois' agencies was to multiply this $14 million 
per year by the greater size of the proposed Chicago casino 
'oU St. nl., Illinois State Budget: Fiscal Year 1991 ($25 billion); see U.S. Abstract 
1993, note 40 supra, at 300;' The World Almanac 137 (1993). See note 40 supra . 
.u See Chicago Gaming Commission, Economic and Other Impacts of a Proposed 
Gaming. Entertainment and Hotel Facility 263-266 (May 19, 1992) (report prepared 
by Deloitte & Touche, Chicago, Dl.) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Gaming Facility 
Report] . 
.. Editorial, "Economically, casinos are a good bet," Chicago Tribune, May 24, 
1992, § 4, at 2 [hereinafter cited as Economically]. "Delolne & Touche also projects 
the loss of 2,300 jobs and $126 million in sales Downstate, $65 million in casino 
regulatory costs and $11.4 million in annual costs for police and ,fire protection." 
1d. at 2. For the actual esti~tes, see Proposed Gaming Facility Report, note 45 
supra, at 234-245. For a comparison of the administrative costs of state lotteries, 
see OeBoer, "The Administrative Costs of State Lotteries," 38 Nat'l Tax J. 479 
(1985). . 
. 47 Proposed Gaming Facility Report, note 45 supra, at 236-241; see Economi-
cally, note 46 supra, at 2. The calculations are as follows: 
$65 million + $2.5.1 billion = .2.58 % 
.. $1104 million + $2.5.1 billion = .045 % 
See also Crim. Just. Info., note.42 supra, at 45; Chicago Crime Comm'n, note 1 
supra, at 21. '. ........ . . .... . 
4 T. Ryan, P. Connor, & J. Speyrer,' The Impact of Casino Gambling in New 
Orleans 46-47 (1990). These calculations were apparently analyzed and considered 
to be "bahl11ced" and valid. Goodman, note 18 supra, at 85-87; m. St. Police 
Report, note 2 supra, at 9; Dir. nl. St. Police, note 42 supra, at 9-10. These costs 
do not include many "indirect costs" to the criminal justice system. For analyses of 
other "criminal law" issues, see generally Gaines. "Criminal Law: Florida's Legal 
Lotteries," 9U. Fla. L. rev. 93 (1956). 
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complex (using the industry's own system of commonly utilized 
square-foot multipliers), which would yield increased costs to 
the illinois criminal justice system of between $98 million and 
$140 million. However, in an attempt to minimize any problems 
of counting similar costs twice because of the different methodol-
ogies utilized in different studies and in; different states, the 
higher costs that would tend to occur when trying to transpose 
the New Orleans casino estimates to the larger Chicago casino 
complex were not included in this analysis-although the latter 
two categories of increased costs to the district attorney's office 
and the cout:ts probably would not involve any significant overlap 
with the illinois figures. These costs ranged somewhere from a 
base of $3.8 million to an upper range of $26.6 million to $38 . 
. million (if the industry's square-foot multipliers were used). -, 
Therefore, projecting an additional $3.8 million in costs to the 
court system of lllinois was probably extremely conservative, 
but was not added to the basic calculations in the analys.is that 
follows. Similarly, it was difficult to determine where to add 
Governor James Edgar's increases for the new prisons that would 
be required at a cost of $15 million per prison per year, and these 
costs were not included.49 
When the conservative lllinois costs are added together, the 
projected $500 million per year in estimated tax revenues~O to be 
paid by the proposed 1992 Chicago casino complex pale in 
significance. The relatively minor amounts paid in taxes become 
more apparent when it is recognized that the $500 million is 
really a "projection" that (1) does not materialize until the tenth 
year, and only at $371 rnilIion;~1 (2) includes all taxes from ''all'' 
conceivable taxable sources;~ and (3) involves a dispersion (to a 
49 Press Release, Off. Ill. Gov: James Edgar, "Governor Warns Land-Based 
Casinos Could Bring Crime Surge as Well as Overall Loss of Jobs and State 
Revenues," Sept. 29, 1993 [hereinafter cited as Gov. Edgar Press Release]] 
'0 Proposed Gaming Facility Report, note 45 supra, at 270-272. Editorial, 
"Daley, developers raise the stakes," Chicago Tribune, Mar. 26, 1992, § 1, at 28 
("$500 million in annual tax revenues") [hereinafter cited as Stakes]. Contra, 
Economically, note 46 supra, at 2 ("$327 million in taXes"). These two editorials 
in' the ChicagoTribune during the same time frame demonStrate. how from the 
public's perspective the economic "positives" fluctuate ·dramatically-in ,this in-
stance between $327 million and $500 million in tax revenues. 
51 Proposed Gaming Facility Report, note 45 supra, at 270-271. Obviously, this 
amount can increase or decrease significantly depending on diverse assumptions. 
'2 [d. The tax revenues include, for example, "direct, induced, and indirect" tax 
revenues from alcohol, automobile rental, corporate income tax ($28-42 million in 
tenth year), franchise taxes, fuel taxes, hotel occupancy, licenses, r.eal property 
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large degree) of taxes to the different local and state governments. 
lllinois Governor James Edgar believed that the state of Dlinois 
could only expect realistically to receive $100 million in new tax 
revenues, which would not compen~ate for the increased state 
police costs of $100 million p~us the increased regulatory costs 
of $(i5 million. n Despite these constraints, the gambling propo-
nents' own estimate of $500 million will be utilized in this 
example." 
Even if it is assumed that the $500 million is the most 
accurate number, the $500 million shrinks to $323.6 million when 
. deducting for the increased costs to the lllinois state police of 
$100 million per year plus the increased local police and fire 
protection costs of $11.4 million per year plus the increased 
regulatory ~osts of $65 million per year. However, the largest 
deduction to the projected tax revenues consists of the increased 
socio-economic costs du.e to the increased numbers of compulsive 
gamblers that the Chicago casino complex would generate. These 
costs are conservatively calculated at $3.7 billion. 55 
Similar costs can be calculated by utilizing costs from socio-
economic studies. Calculating the Chicago population and the 
surrounding Cook County population at 5.1 million, 56 the popula-
tion base would be approxirilately 5 million. Since' 'hard" casino 
gambling would· be moving in~o an area that had only the state 
lottery plus horse racing and off-track betting, the 5 million could 
be "conservatively" multiplied by .0073, which equals 36,500 
compulsive gamblers~57 This number of 36,500 compulsive gam-
transfer taxes, sales taxes ($34-48 million in tenth year), telecommunications, 
utilities, withholding taxes ($26-90 million in tenth· year) for a subtotal of $97-:212 
, million, not including the gaming tax. Id. The gaming tax at 7.7 percent as 
"pI"C'ferred" by the proponents of the casino complex would add another $121-123 
million, while a 10 percent tax would add $158-160 million for a grand total of 
$257-370 million (assuming the higher 10 percent gapting tax). Id. 
53 Interview with lli. Gov. James Edgar, on "Crossfire," Cable News Network, 
Jan. 6,1993.' . . ' '.'. "" ' . . 
'" Proposeci.oaming FacilityReport, note~5 supr;a, at 270-272; Stakes, note SO 
supra, at 28. 'J..., .," '.' .,., ", 
J5~r Gov't Assoc. Report,Dote6 sup~a, at'14, 16-17. SeegenerallyR. 
Custer &H. Milt, When LuckRuns Out (1985); H. Shaffer, S. Stein, B. Gambino, 
&T. Cummings, C.ompuLrive Gambling (1989) ; Levitz, The Experimental Induction 
,of Compulsive Gambling. Behaviors (thesis on file at U. lli., Champaign-Urbana, 
lli. 1971) •. ,. .. . . , 
. "1heWorldAlmiznac432 (1993). See note 40 supra. 
S1 Actually,' an increase of '.73 percent is probably much too conservative. An 
increase of 1-1.5 pe~ent would be more probable. See e.g., Alta. Gaming, note 6 
supra, at 17-18. 
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bIers multiplied by $52,000 per yearS8 yields an increased socio-
economic cost of$I.9 billion. 
Two additional subcategories of the socio-economic costs per 
year are "white-collar crime costs" of $4,123 per yearS9 and 
, 'intermediate incarceration costs" of $21 ,000 per year. 60 There-
fore, additional specific'socio-economic costs related to compul-
sive gamblers interfacing with the criminal justice system would 
be: 
Increased "White-Collar Crime Costs" =. $4,123/yr. X 
36,500 = $150 million 
Increased "Intermediate Incarceration Costs" = $21,000/ 
yr. X 36,500~.= $766 million 
Increased "Long-Term Incarceration Costs" = $2,400/yr. 
X 36,500 = $87.6 million 
The total costs of these three categories would be approximately 
$1 billion. The long-term incarceration costs, specifically $87.6 
million per year, are explained in the following discussion. 
According to the Compulsive Gambling Center, practically 
all compulsive gamblers commit crimes. 61 General averages 
indicate that 75 percent of compulsive gamblers are not caught· 
or the charges are not pressed. 62 This latter instance is usually 
due to the fact that most compUlsive gamblers commit their initial 
,. Politzer, Morrow, & Leavey, note 3 supra, at 18-20,20. The better "adjusted" 
number is $53,000 per year. See Better Gov't Assoc. Report, note 6 supra, at 14, 
16-17. See also Md. Dep't Health & Mental Hygiene, Alcohol & Drug Abuse 
Admin., Final Report: Task Force on Gambling Addiction in Maryland 2, 59-61 
(Y. Lorenz & R. Politzer, co-chairs 1990) [hereinafter cited as Maryland Report}. 
!!9 Politzer, Morrow, &,:: Leavey, note 3 supra, at 8,18-20. 
IIJ Id. at 9, 18-20. 
61 Interview with Dr. Valerie Lorenz, Exec. Dir., Compulsive Gambling Ctr., 
Inc., Baltimore, Md., Dec. 10, 1992 [hereinafter cited as Lorenz Interview}; 
Maryland Report, note 58 supra, at 28. For general discussions of the interface 
between compulsive gambling and resultant criminal behavior, see Brown, "Patho-
logical Gambling and Associated Patterns of Crime: Comparisons With Alcohol 
and Other Drug Addictions, " 3 J. Gambling Behav. 98 (1987); Lesieur, "Gambling, 
Pathological Gambling, and Crime," in The Handbook of Pathological Gambling 
(T. Galski ed. 1987). See generally J. Livingston, Compulsive Gamblers: Observa-
tions on Action and Abstinence (1974); Gamblers and Crime, note 3 supra, at 495. 
02 Lorenz Interview, note 61 supra; see Maryland Report, note 58 supra, at 28. 
"Research on the connection between pathological gambling and crime is still in its 
infancy. " Gamblers and Crime, note 3 supra, at 496. 
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criminal activities against family members or close associates63-
for example, stealing money out of a family member's purse or 
wallet, or selling or pawning property belonging to family 
members. 64 
The other 25 percent of compulsive gamblers usually find 
themselves in court and 60 percent of these, or 15 percent of the 
total number of compulsive gamblers, are convicted and must 
serve time in jail.65 The general long-term average cost of 
incarceration for a healthy compulsive gambler is $25,000 per 
year, and for an elderly individual, $50,000 per year. 66 By 
comparison, the average lllinois cost of incarceration per prisoner 
was $16,000 per year.67 Taking the most conservative cost of 
incarceration, the costs of incarcerating compulsive gamblers 
p~r year before gambling is legalized in a state are: 
.0077' X (state population) = number of compulsive gam-
blers before legalization 
.0077 X (state population) x 15% x $16,OOO/year = 
cost of incarcerating compulsive gamblers per year before 
gambling is legalized 
6J Maryland Report, note 58 supra, at 28; see Gamblers and Crime, note 3 supra, 
at 496-497. 
64 Lorenz Interview, note 61 supra. For more detailed analyses, see, 'e.g., 
Lesieur, Compulsive Gambling: Documenting the Social and Economic Costs, 
Table 2, at 21 (1991), published in part as Lesieur, .. Compulsive Gambling," 
Society, May-June 1992, at 42. See also Lesieur & Puig, "Insurance ProbJems and 
Pathological Gambling," 3 J. Gambling Behav. 123 (1987); Gamblers and Crime, 
note 3 supra, at 496-497; Meyer & Fabian, note 8 supra, at 518. . 
.: ~ Lorenz Interview, note 61 supra . 
• 66 Id. By comparison, in 1990 the states alone (Le., excluding federal costs) 
incurred $23.5 billion in just •• corrections" costs for an inmate popuation of 557 ,000 
(1989 figure reported in 1990). Thus, the average cost to a state for each prisoner 
was approximately $42,300 per year. Off. Just. Programs, Bur. Just. Stat., U.S. 
Dep't JuSt~, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-l 991 , at 4 (Table 1.4) & 14 
(Table '1.10) (1992) [hereinafter cited as Just. Stat. 1991]. These same numbers 
were reprinted in the 1992 edition. Off. Just. Programs, Bur. Just. Stat., U.S. Dep't 
Just., Sourcebook of Criminal lusQce Statistics-1992, at 4 (Table IA) (1993) 
[hereinafter cited as Ju.st. Stat. 1992]." ' .•. ..' 
01 Ill. Dep't Corrections, Fiscal Year 1993: ,Annual Report 60, 62 (1994); Ill. 
Dep't Corrections, Fiscal Year 1992: Annual Report 56, 58 (1993). The average 
Dlinois state cost of $16,000 per year per prisoner has remained relatively the 
same fro~ 1990 to 1994. This analysis does not address the significant costs of 
incarceration in the ,"federal" prison system, which explains in part the higher 
estimates for compulsive gamblers. . . . 
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.015 x (state population) --+ .05 x (state popuiation) -
range of compulsive gamblers after gambling is legalized 
.015 X (state population) x 15 % X $16,000/year --+ 
.05 X (state population) X 15 %x $16,000/year = range of 
costs of incarcerating compulsive gamblers per year once 
gambling is legalized. 
As applied to the 1992 proposed Chicago casino complex, the 
calculations would consist of the previously calculated "in-
crease" of 36,500 compulsive gamblers68 multiplied by the 
"long-term incarceration costs" of $2,400 per year,69 which 
equals "total long-term incarceration costs" of $87.6 million 
per year. To avoid confusion, it should be noted that the cost of 
$2,400 per year is expressed as a function of the total number of 
compulsive gamblers, whereas the cost of $16,000 per year is 
expressed as a function of only 15 percent of the total number of 
compulsive gamblers. 
The state of TIlinois calculated that the actual tax revenues 
from the 1992 proposed Chicago casino complex would be $82.5 
million in the first year of operation, while the lost tax revenues 
from other legalized gambling organizations in Illinois would be 
$100 million, for a net loss of $17.5 million.70 However, even. if 
the larger projected tax revenues of the Chicago complex were 
presumed to be correct, the gravamen is that for theoretical tax 
revenues of $500 million (or more accurately, $257 million to 
$370 million), the following costs to the state ofTIlinois could be 
anticipated: 
Increased TIL State Police Costs'l 
Increased Local Police and Fire 
Protection Costs72 
Increased Regulatory Costs73 
Increased White-Collar Crime Costs74 
IIlI See notes 56-58 supra and accompanying text. 
69 See notes 61-67 sup~a and accompanying text. 
70 Gov. Edgar Press Release, note 49 supra. 
71 See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text. 
n See note 47 supra and accompanying text. 
73 See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text. 
7' See footnotes 58-61 supra and accompanying text. 
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Increased Intermediate Incarceration 
Costs7~ 
Increased Long-Term Incarceration 
Costs76 
766 million 
87.6 million 
$1.18 billion 
Of course, this $1.18 billion does not include the other socio-
economic costs of $1.9 billionn (which is quite conservative 
when compared with the reasonable $3.7 billion calculated by 
the Better Government Association). 78 
To be extremely conservative, the last category of long-term 
incarcertion costs can range between $87.6 million and zero if it 
can be argued that somehow this category can be subsumed 
somewhat under intermediate incarceration costs. Similarly, the 
costs to the Illinois state police can range between $100 million 
and $42 million. Absent new data to the contrary, the other four 
categories seem to be fairly well established as solid estimates. 
Accordingly, the best estimates of increased costs to the criminal 
justice system with the introduction of legalized casino-style 
gambling in the major Illinois population base appear to range 
between $1.03 billion and $1.18 billion. It should be emphasized 
that these numbers were calculated by state agencies and academ-
ics in 1992-before significant or widespread riverboat gambling 
was in operation in Illinois, particularly in the Chicago area. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the influence of other legalized 
gambling activities em these calculations was minimal, and' other 
states considering legalized gambling activities can extrapolate 
from these numbers and make some strategic calculations of 
increased costs to their criminal justice systems. 
To express these costs to the Illinois criminal justice system 
(including regulatory costs) as a function of the entire population, 
the $1.03 billion to $1.18 billion can be divided by the taxpayer 
base that will have to support most of these costs; that is, the 
population of the state of Illinois of approximately 11 million.79 
This type of per capita calculation is regularly utilized in the 
. 7~ Id. 
7·ld. 
77 See note 58 supra and accompanying text. 
71 See note 55 supra and accompanying text. 
79 The World Almanac 389 (1993) (Illinois population = 11.43 million). 
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statistics promulgated by the U.S. Justice Department. so Accord-
ingly, the $1.03 billion to $1.18 billion divided by 11 million 
provides a range of$93 to $107 per person. These costs expressed 
as a funciton of each "new compuJsive gambler" would be 
$28,200 to $32,300 per year. 11 The other socio-economic costs 
of $1.9 billion per year would translate into $173 per Illinois 
resident or $52,000 per new compulsive gambler. 82 . 
By comparison, the 1990 "preexisting costs" to the illinois 
criminal justice system expressed as a cost per Illinois resident 
totaled $232.58 or specifically: (1) $125.08 police protection; 
(2) $26.44 courts; (3) $12.67 prosecution and legal services; (4) 
$3.34 public defense; (5) $63.72 corrections; and (6) $1.34 
other justice activities . 83 In summary, each Illinois resident must 
contribute $232.58 for preexisting costs to the criminal justice 
system. This amount should be compared with the $93 to $107 
per person increases projected by studies as necessary to accom-
modate increased legalized gambling activities (e.g., via a large 
Chicago casino complex). Therefore, increased large-scale legal-
ized gambling activities could precipitate fairly immediate in-
creases to the state criminal justice system of 40 to 50 percent. 
. Similarly for other states, some important strategic approxi-
mations of increased costs to the criminal justice system can be 
calculated by multiplying these new "added" costs of $93 per 
person (the most conservative cost) times the population of the 
state. Obviously, these numbers need to be refmed for different 
demographics, but they provide the starting point for the calcula-
tions. However, the number of new (or anticipated) compulsive 
gamblers can be calculated with some certainty, and therefore, 
the cost of $28,200 per year per new compulsive gambler 
provides a base point for costs to the criminal justice system 
(including regulatory costs). 
- Of course, there is some error in these numbers, but as of 
10 See, e.g., Just. Stat. 1992, note 66 supra, at 5 (Table 1.5); Just. Stat. 1991, 
note 66 supra, at 5 (Table 1.5) . 
. II See notes 58, 71-76 supra and accompanying text. The calculation is $1.18 
billion per year divided by. 36,500 calculated new compulsive gamblers (a conserva-
tive estimate). Much higher costs have been calculated.' See, e.g., Maryland Report, 
note 58 supra, at2. . ··.i ... 
Il See Politzer, Morrow, & Leavey, note 3 supra,at 8:;-~, 18-20. 
13 Just. Stat. 1991, note 66 supra,.at 5 (Table 1.5). These same numbers were 
reprinted in the 1992 edition. Just. Stat. 1992, note 66 supra,.at 5 (Table 1.5). 
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1992, these estimates appeared to be the best available. These 
numbers have much more' 'balanced" support from the academic 
authorities84 and from the field research,8-' than the numbers 
usually referenced by the legalized gambling interests. 86 
It should be emphasized that as the Better Government Associ-
ation of Chicago reported: 
We found that no one [that is, no expert] argues that casino gambling 
has positive societal effects, except for the purported secondary effects 
from the economic gains of more jobs and tax revenue. As a result, any 
debate over the societal effects of legalizing an additional form of 
gambling centers around the extent of the negative social impact .... 87 
This conclusion should be broader in its scope, because the 
negative societal impacts also affect business-economics, com-
merce, and legal and governmental policy. The costs that can be 
calculated fairly accurately-namely, the socia-economic costs, 
the criminal justice system costs, and the administrative costs to 
state governments-can be readily converted into economic costs 
affecting businesses and commerce in general. Accordingly, the 
"purported secondary effects from the economic gains of more 
jobs and tax revenue "88 are, in fact, overwhelmed by the socio-
economic costs and are illusory benefits akin to "fool's gold."89 
... See, e.g., Better Gov'tAssoc. Report, note 6 supra, at 2-3. 
ItS Id. at 121-123; see Goodman, note 18 supra, at 16, 39-46, 68-87. 
16 Better Gov't Assoc. Report, note 6 supra, at 124-126. See generally Goodman, 
note 18 supra. . 
17 Better Gov't Assoc. Report, note 6· supra, at 2 (1st emphasis added and 2d 
emphasis original). 
81 Better Gov't Assoc. Report, note 6 supra, at 2. 
19 Reutter, "Economists: Allure of legalized gambling like that of fool's gold," 
Inside TIl., Jan. 18, 1992, at 7 (copies available from Univ. TIl. News Bur.). 
Furthexmore, the • 'poor and desperate people of our states are those who are most 
likely to fall for the promise of the elusive pot of gold," which thus represents a 
"regressive tax on those who are least able to afford it." Mich. Att'y Gen., note 
31,supra,at2. . 
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